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RESUMO: Neste artigo nós investigamos a dinâmica de médio a longo prazo que 
emerge do fenômeno da doença holandesa com financeirização. Nos inspiramos no 
caso mais recente do padrão de desenvolvimento da Colômbia. A doença holandesa 
pura causa desindustrialização, em primeiro lugar, ao apreciar permanentemente a 
taxa de câmbio no longo prazo. A financeirização neste caso, isto é, os maiores 
influxos de capital em um cenário de excesso de otimismo financeiro puxado pela 
existência de recursos naturais, leva no médio prazo a uma maior volatilidade na taxa 
de câmbio e à instabilidade macroeconômica. Este processo prejudica ainda mais o 
desenvolvimento do setor manufatureiro ao aumentar a incerteza na economia. A 
recomendação é, portanto, pela adoção do controle de capitais e por uma política 
monetária desenvolvimentista a fim de confrontar os fenômenos da financeirização e 
da doença holandesa. 
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ABSTARCT: We formally investigate the medium-to-long-run dynamics emerging 
out of a Dutch disease-cum-financialization phenomenon. We take inspiration from 
the most recent Colombian development pattern. The “pure” Dutch disease first 
causes deindustrialization by permanently appreciating the economy’s exchange rate 
in the long run. Financialization, i.e. booming capital inflows taking place in a climate 
of natural resource-led financial over-optimism, causes medium-run exchange rate 
volatility and macroeconomic instability. This jeopardizes manufacturing 
development even further by raising macroeconomic uncertainty. We advise the 
adoption of capital controls and a developmentalist monetary policy to tackle these 
two distinct but often intertwined phenomena. 
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NATURAL RESOURCE BOOMS, CAPITAL INFLOWS AND 
EXTERNAL BALANCE DYNAMICS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
In the last two decades, several economists have supported the idea that 
financial liberalization and free capital movements can be relevant causes of 
macroeconomic volatility. Their concern was mainly about volatile portfolio 
investment. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is usually positively considered 
instead. In the case of developing countries, it is believed to contribute to 
domestic capital formation and enhance labor productivity through the 
“import” of more advanced technologies.  
FDI’s positive contribution to economic progress in developing countries 
cannot be taken as given. It depends on the way FDI integrates into the 
productive system of the recipient economy. The sectorial pattern of 
incoming FDI is likely to be a decisive factor. In instance, FDI in the 
manufacturing sector may foster long-term growth by spreading 
technological progress, and by possibly weakening external balance 
constraints through the diversification of the domestic productive structure. 
On the contrary, natural resource-oriented FDI very often constitutes 
separate enclaves within the productive system of the host economy, and 
could give rise to Dutch disease by increasing the economy dependence on 
natural resource industries. 
There is an abundant literature on the Dutch disease and on its possible 
causes. Corden and Neary (1982), Sachs and Warner (2001), and Ros (2001) 
propose supply-side models that describe the Dutch disease as emerging 
from natural resource booms. Taylor (1983) and Bresser-Pereira (2008, 
2010, 2013) address such a topic into structuralist heterodox frameworks. 
Several empirical studies broaden the concept of Dutch disease and attribute 
Dutch disease-like effects to a variety of foreign resource inflows, foreign 
aid, emigrants’ remittances, and different types of capital inflows alike.        
These contributions rely upon rather different theories and adopt different 
approaches. Nevertheless, most of them share a common vision of the Dutch 
disease as a real-side phenomenon that manifests itself through real-side 
mechanisms. They maintain the same perspective as developed in Corden 
and Neary (1982), and “ignore monetary considerations and focus on 
[natural resource booms’] implications for real rather than nominal variables 
(Corden and Neary, 1982, p. 825)”. In particular, they do not consider the 
repercussions that the increasing exploitation and export of natural resources 
may trigger off on the medium/long-run dynamics of an economy by 
affecting the external balance account and the determination of the nominal 
exchange rate.  
Bresser-Pereira (2008, 2010, 2013), and Bresser-Pereira et al. (2014) 
have recently developed a different approach addressing such a shortcoming. 
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Bresser-Pereira (2010), for instance, efficaciously describes the Dutch 
disease as a long-run structural phenomenon according to which the 
exploitation of abundant and cheap resources induces a “chronic 
overvaluation of a country’s exchange rate [which is] clearly more 
appreciated than the average exchange rate that makes tradable goods 
industries economically viable [and therefore] obstruct industrialization [or] 
provokes deindustrialization (Bresser-Pereira, 2010, pp. 149-150)”. The 
Dutch disease is therefore “consistent with the intertemporal equilibrium of 
foreign accounts […but] implies the existence of a difference between the 
exchange rate that balances the current account and the exchange rate that 
enables efficient and technologically sophisticated economic sectors 
(Bresser-Pereira, 2010, p.150)”.  
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature on the Dutch 
disease and the effects of natural resource-oriented FDI on both the medium 
and long-run economic dynamics of developing countries. We closely follow 
Bresser-Pereira’s approach and his definition of Dutch disease. In this sense, 
we model the permanent appreciating effect that the exploitation and export 
of domestic natural resources can have on the exchange rate this way 
dampening long-run manufacturing development and productivity growth. 
Beyond this, we try to extend Bresser-Pereira’s analysis by describing the 
volatile medium-run macroeconomic dynamics that may emerge when the 
Dutch disease comes with booming natural resource-oriented FDI and, more 
in general, with the financialization1 of the recipient economy. In doing so, 
we take inspiration from the most recent Colombian development pattern, 
the so-called “locomotora minero-energetica” according to the emphatic 
rhetoric of the Colombian government. The kind of medium-run dynamics 
we describe start from FDI targeting developing countries’ natural resources 
and affecting their external balance equilibrium. Following Singh (2003), in 
a flexible exchange rate regime long-term FDI induces the exchange rate to 
appreciate. Exchange rate appreciation, which is first nominal and then real, 
in turn attracts additional portfolio investment by reducing perceived country 
risks or increasing capital gains’ expectations. Portfolio capital inflows feed 
back on exchange rate dynamics and lead to an even stronger appreciation. 
However, these self-reinforcing mechanisms may not last long. Rather, they 
may eventually reverse when economic agents realize that they have gone 
too far and medium-run exchange rate appreciation and the accumulation of 
foreign debt has been excessive.  
                                                
1 Financialization is a very broad and not well-defined concept. Here we use this term to define the 
climate of exuberance and rising interests of international financial operators in investing in developing 
countries following the occurrence of a sort of “structural break” event. In this paper, such a “break” takes 
the form of a natural resource boom. This may play the same role that radical regime changes, say 
financial liberalization or the privatization of state-owned companies in the context of restrictive macro 
policies, historically covered in several developing economies (see Taylor, 1991, ch. 6).       
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We describe two undesirable outcomes that can arise from such a 
medium-to-long-run dynamics. First, the increasing exploitation and export 
of domestic natural resources causes a permanent nominal and real 
appreciation of the exchange rate (with respect to that one consistent with 
manufacturing development). Following Bresser-Pereira (2008, 2010, 2013), 
this is the “pure” Dutch disease phenomenon, which in this paper 
materializes through financial and monetary mechanisms (i.e. the 
determination of the nominal exchange rate on financial markets) rather than 
the real-side ones (i.e. spending effects modifying the relative price of 
tradable versus non-tradable goods) generally put at the center of traditional 
Dutch disease models. Second, when the Dutch disease comes along with the 
financialization of the economy, i.e. booming natural resource-oriented FDI 
and portfolio investment, such long-run exchange rate appreciation may be 
accompanied by medium-term exchange rate volatility and macroeconomic 
instability. A developing country-type Minskyan cycle may easily take place 
(see Frenkel and Rapetti, 2009; Harvey, 2010). A sharpened exchange rate 
volatility and the ensuing macroeconomic instability can lower 
manufacturing development and long-run growth potential even further since 
that productive investment in manufacturing is usually highly sensitive to 
this type of instability.      
The kind of Dutch disease-cum-financialization model we present has the 
virtue to highlight two aspects of exchange rate dynamics, and hence of its 
policy management, which are both relevant to manufacturing and long-run 
economic development of developing countries. The first aspect is the need 
to maintain a competitive real exchange rate by managing the nominal one 
(among other variables). We explicitly consider this point when we deal with 
the long-run effects of natural resource booms on manufacturing 
development (Section 3). The second perhaps more neglected aspect is the 
need to keep such a competitive exchange rate stable. This aspect is 
addressed when we analyze the medium-run volatile macroeconomic 
dynamics emerging from booming capital inflows directly or indirectly 
associated to the natural resource boom itself and the (vulnerable) euphoric 
climate it may temporarily trigger (Section 2). In this regard, our paper is an 
extension of some traditional Dutch disease models that formalize external 
imbalances into perfect-foresight infinite-lifetime frameworks, and therefore 
neglect exchange rate volatility and macroeconomic instability by 
assumption, since that external borrowing and rising foreign debt today are 
fully and safely repaid by increasing domestic savings and rising current 
account surpluses tomorrow (see Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Mansoorian, 
1991). On the contrary, our model tries to merge together the existing 
literature on natural resource booms and the Dutch disease, with the long-
standing heterodox concern for Minskyan exchange rate-external debt cycles 
(see Frenkel and Rapetti, 2009; Harvey, 2010) and Balance of Payments 
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(BoPs)-dominance regimes (Ocampo, 2013) that recurrently unfold and 
shape, or better restrain, economic development in developing countries. 
2. NATURAL RESOURCE-CUM-FINANCIALIZATION 
BOOMS AND MEDIUM-RUN MACROECONOMIC 
INSTABILITY.  
Since mid-2000s, Colombia has increasingly attracted the attention of 
financial operators as a promising growing economy where to invest and 
realize high returns. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2013), for instance, 
describes Colombia as a “[…] success story [which] is now one of the most 
open and most business-friendly countries in Latin America [...and in which] 
new opportunities are opening up for foreign investors, particularly in 
hydrocarbons and mining, construction, and electricity (EIU 2013, p.8)”.  
Despite of foreign investors’ enthusiasm about Colombian development, 
in a previous empirical work we documented some disturbing facts that may 
undermine Colombia’s bright future: 
1. The recent development of the Colombian economy has been mainly 
driven by the expansion of the domestic energy and mining sector, oil in 
particular. The expansion of the Colombian mining industry has been 
largely driven by massive FDI targeting Colombian natural resources. 
Since 2005, it has accounted for 50 percent or more of total FDI, and has 
amounted to more than 2 percent yearly of Colombian GDP. 
2. The increasing exploitation and export of Colombian natural resources, as 
accompanied by massive net FDI inflows, have come at the cost of 
jeopardizing Colombian manufacturing development. Since mid 2000s, 
the Colombian manufacturing sector has shrank, both in relative terms 
with respect to mining and service and, sometimes, even in absolute 
terms. There is widespread consensus that the Dutch disease is underway 
in Colombia (Goda and Torres, 2013; OECD, 2013).  
3. According to the literature just mentioned, the contraction of Colombian 
manufacturing is due to the appreciation of the Colombian real exchange 
rate, which has made Colombian homemade manufactured goods 
increasingly uncompetitive on both the international goods market and 
into the home economy. Let’s define the Colombian real exchange rate as 
q = ePF/PH, where “e” is the nominal exchange rate, “PF” is the foreign 
consumer price index (in foreign currency), and “PH” is the home 
economy’s consumer price index (in Colombian pesos). From 2003 to 
2014, the Colombian nominal exchange rate appreciated (i.e. “e” 
decreased) by 5,7 percent yearly, whilst real appreciation (i.e. a reduction 
in “q”) was in the order of 5 percent yearly only. According to the IMF’s 
2014 World Economic Outlook, the inflation targeting monetary policy 
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implemented by the Colombian central bank has been effective in 
keeping Colombian inflation under control. Colombian inflation has 
declined since 2008. It has been significantly lower than that observed in 
other emerging economies, and sometimes close to that registered in 
developed economies. According to these facts, the appreciation of the 
Colombian real exchange rate has been primarily driven by nominal 
dynamics and by the determination of the nominal exchange rate on the 
currency market rather than by real factors linked to (relative) inflation 
dynamics (i.e. changes in consumer price indexes). In the flexible 
exchange rate regime characterizing Colombia, increasing primary 
commodities’ exports and massive FDI inflows have been the leading 
forces behind the appreciation of the Colombian nominal, and hence real 
exchange rate. Both flows have jointly contributed to determine a 
remarkable financial account surplus outstripping a modest trade account 
deficit, this way generating an excess demand for Colombian pesos in the 
currency market.  
4. Due to an euphoric investment climate surrounding Colombia and 
deriving from its natural resource boom, increasingly positive net 
portfolio investment has followed the initial surge in FDI, this way 
inflating the demand for Colombian pesos even further. Considerable 
portfolio investment has been attracted by the expectation for a persistent 
Colombian pesos appreciation making foreign currency-denominated 
external financing cheaper (from the point of view of potential 
Colombian borrowers), and/or capital gains on Colombian assets higher 
(from the point of view of foreign investors). According to the Colombian 
central bank, net portfolio investment flows in Colombia were almost 
zero (or negative) in the first half of the 2000s. Since 2007 (and with the 
only exception of 2008) they have exhibited positive values. From 2011 
to 2013, they amounted to more than 5.5 billion dollars yearly, more than 
1.5% of Colombian GDP. In the first quarter of 2014, it stood at more 
than 2.5 billion dollars. 
5. In line with the stylized facts described at points (1) – (4), a standard BoP 
current account deficit-with-foreign saving financing has emerged in 
Colombia. Mounting FDI first and portfolio investment later have 
financed a widening Colombian current account. Despite of rising oil 
exports and high and increasing prices of primary commodities until the 
end of 2014, since 2003 the Colombian trade balance has been slightly 
positive only in 2011. This undesirable dynamics is the outcome of a 
large and widening manufacturing trade balance deficit around 10 percent 
of GDP. Moreover, the Colombian overall current account has registered 
considerable deficits due to booming profits repatriation by foreign firms 
operating in the Colombian mining sector mainly. According to the IMF 
(2015), the drop in the oil price that has been taking place since the last 
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months of 2014 is expected to worsen the Colombian current account 
balance even further, and bring it close to 5,9 percent of GDP in 2015. 
6. The recent drop in the international price of oil and the slowdown in FDI 
has triggered off, since the end of 2014, a reversal in the Colombian 
exchange rate dynamics. Such a reversal raises serious doubts about the 
external solidity of Colombia. According to the IMF (2015), the decline 
in oil price, as well as the increasing dependency on portfolio investment 
to finance current account deficits, “could lead to sharp repricing of 
Colombian assets and exchange rate […and] could lead to heightened 
vulnerability to global financial volatility (IMF, 2015)”. 
In the present paper we adopt an inductive approach. We take the 
Colombian stylized facts as the starting point in order to develop a more 
general model that formally describes the above macroeconomic dynamics, 
the economic mechanisms behind them, and the possible threats posed to 
Colombian (and perhaps other resource abundant economies) development 
by both the long-run consequences of the Dutch disease and the medium-run 
implications of a (BoPs) current account deficit-cum-foreign saving 
financing development pattern. In doing this, the medium-run part of our 
model formalizes the argumentative analyses by Frenkel and Rapetti (2009), 
and Harvey (2010) of developing country-type external account Minskyan 
cycles. 
Let’s assume a small open developing economy exhibiting three 
characteristics. First, the economy has a significant endowment of natural 
resources. Second, the economy is open to free capital movements. Both 
long-term FDI and short/medium-term portfolio investment are allowed. For 
the sake of simplicity, we assume FDI to concentrate in the natural resource 
sector only. Portfolio investment takes mainly the form of short/medium-
term foreign debt (denominated in foreign currency).2  Equities are not 
considered, but such simplification does not modify the logic of our model 
and the economic mechanisms we are investigating. Third, the primary 
objective of monetary policy is price stability, and it is implemented via 
inflation targeting. Consistently with an inflation targeting monetary policy, 
the nominal exchange rate is free to float (Mishkin, 2000; Epstein and 
Yeldan, 2009). 
In this paper, we focus on the medium-to-long-run economic dynamics 
that may unfold in a resource abundant developing country when a resource 
booms takes place, and it attracts FDI first and portfolio investment later by 
stimulating an euphoric investment climate. We therefore neglect to describe 
short-run mechanisms. We take inspiration from Taylor (2004, ch.10), who 
                                                
2 See Taylor (1998), Neftci (1998) and Frenkel and Rapetti (2009) on the short-term structure of foreign 
liabilities of domestic agents, financial intermediaries in particular, in the emerging economies affected 
by financial and currency crises in 1990s.  
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describes a prototype developing country’s external balance cycle in the case 
of a fixed exchange rate regime. According to the purposes of our analysis, 
and in light of the stylized facts we described, we adapt Taylor’s dynamic 
equations to the case of a flexible exchange rate setting. We do that in 
equation (1):  
 
(1)  𝑒 = 𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑝! 𝑞(𝑒) − !"#!(!(!))! − 𝑒𝑥𝑝!" + 𝑖!𝐷 + 𝜋!" + 𝑅 − 𝐾𝐴!" 𝑖! −𝑖! − 𝜎 𝑒,𝐷 − 𝐾𝐴!"#(𝑁)   
 
Taylor (2004, ch.10) explains the evolution of a country’s foreign 
reserves as the endogenous outcome of the interaction among various 
components of the corresponding BoPs. In our model, foreign reserves are 
an exogenous policy variable in the hands of domestic monetary authorities 
through which they may try to control the nominal exchange rate dynamics. 
In equation (1), the interplay between the several components of the BoPs 
current and financial accounts now determines the dynamics of the nominal 
exchange rate. Following Taylor (2004, ch.10), equation (1) does not show 
the standard Mundell-Fleming dichotomy between a flexible exchange rate 
and endogenous foreign reserves as adjusting variables for short-run external 
imbalances. Equation (1) does not determine any instantaneous equilibrium 
level of the nominal exchange rate e. It simply takes into account some 
factors included in the BoPs, i.e. trade flows, net income transfers, and 
financial flows, that may drive the evolution of the nominal exchange rate by 
influencing the excess demand or excess supply for the domestic currency on 
the currency market. Equation (1), for instance, shows that nominal 
exchange rate dynamics is strongly influenced by interest rate differentials 
and country-factor risk premiums, which modify portfolio investment 
decisions and net portfolio capital flows, hence determining changes and 
temporary trends in the exchange rate dynamics (𝑒). 
In equation (1) we put emphasis on those components of the BoPs that 
may be of relevance to formally grasp the stylized facts described above. 
Equation (1) distinguishes between imports and exports of manufactured 
goods as expressed in foreign currency, impM and (expM/e) respectively; 
foreign currency-denominated exports of domestic natural resources expNR, 
say oil; interest payments on foreign debt iHD; foreign firms’ profit 
repatriation out of natural resource revenues 𝜋!"; exogenous central bank-
driven variations of foreign reserves 𝑅; net portfolio capital inflows KAPI, 
and net FDI KAFDI. We assume that foreign firms’ profit repatriation 𝜋!" is a 
constant share α of natural resource exports expNR. 
In equation (1), manufactured goods imports (impM) are denominated in 
foreign currency. According to standard economic theory on trade account 
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dynamics (see the BoPs-constrained growth models à la Thirlwall, for 
instance), they respond negatively to real exchange rate depreciations (i.e. 
higher q values), which make them relatively more costly and less 
competitive with respect homemade goods. Manufactured goods exports 
(expM) are denominated in domestic currency and respond positively to the 
depreciation of the real exchange rate. The overall value (in foreign 
currency) of the manufactured goods trade balance responds positively or 
negatively to real exchange rate shifts depending on the fulfillment of the 
Marshall-Learner condition as applied to the “restricted” case of 
manufactured goods trade (see below). 
The dynamics of the real exchange rate depends on both 
nominal/monetary forces (the evolution of the nominal exchange rate on 
financial markets) and real-side factors (relative inflation rate dynamics). 
Nonetheless, here we follow Bresser-Pereira (2008, 2010, 2013) and we 
focus on the monetary aspects of the story only. We do this on the basis of 
the Colombian experience reviewed before, and due to three main reasons. 
First, traditional Dutch disease models have almost completely neglected to 
consider nominal factors influencing the real exchange rate dynamics. 
However, this is a crucial part of the story, perhaps the most relevant one, if 
one wants to analyze the effects of increasing natural resource exports on the 
determination of the external balance equilibrium, the real exchange rate and 
hence manufacturing development in a consistent full-fledged macro-
accounting framework. This is even more so when the Dutch disease comes 
with huge natural resource-oriented FDI and, more in general, the 
financialization of the home economy. Second, inflation targeting monetary 
policy can at least partially restrain inflation lifts due to abundant capital 
inflows. Relative inflation rate dynamics among trading partners may be of 
minor concern with respect to what observed in the past in presence of fixed 
exchange rate regimes. Third, developing countries’ inflation may easily 
reach higher levels than those observed in foreign economies – developed 
ones in particular (see Frenkel and Rapetti, 2009). Therefore, the inclusion in 
our model of changes in inflation rate differentials would simply reinforce 
the kind of dynamics we already illustrate. For the sake of simplicity, we 
neglect to explicitly model the role played by inflation rate differentials 
among trading partners to explain the evolution of the real exchange rate. 
In the case of developing countries, foreign portfolio investment in debt 
instruments mostly takes the form of foreign currency-denominated 
short/medium-term debt (Mishkin, 2000). Accordingly, foreign lenders do 
not bear any direct exchange rate risk. The amount of net portfolio capital 
inflows is simply determined by the interest rates’ differential (iH – iF), iH and 
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iF being the domestic and foreign interest rates respectively3, and by the 
country-specific factor risk σ. Yet, portfolio net capital flows are related to 
exchange rate dynamics through the lender-borrower default risk. An 
appreciation of the domestic nominal exchange rate (i.e. a decreasing e 
value) helps domestic borrowers to meet their payment commitments (in 
foreign currency) more easily. It follows that the country factor risk 
decreases and portfolio investment increases. In the same vein, a 
depreciation of the exchange rate makes the foreign debt burden less 
sustainable and domestic borrowers’ default risk higher. In this case, the 
ensuing increase in the country-specific risk factor σ curtails (and perhaps 
reverse) net portfolio capital flows. Therefore, the domestic exchange rate 
and short/medium-term portfolio capital flows are connected by an indirect 
negative relationship. 
Net FDI KAFDI is assumed not to depend on the exchange rate, since it 
targets domestic natural resources that are exported on international markets 
and sold in foreign currency. It is positively influenced by the available stock 
of domestic natural resources N.  
Equation (2) makes explicit our assumption of net portfolio capital flows 
mainly consisting of short/medium-term bonds, thus representing foreign 
debt variations: 
 
(2)  𝐷 = 𝐾𝐴!"(𝑖! − 𝑖! − 𝜎 𝑒,𝐷 )      with !!"!"!" < 0; !"!" > 0; !"!" > 0   
 
Equation (2) also states a reasonable negative relationship between the 
current level of foreign indebtedness D and its own dynamics. The higher the 
foreign debt stock is, the less likely foreign lenders are to increase their 
exposition towards domestic economic agents by providing new credit. 
Therefore, there exists a negative self-stabilizing relationship in the 
accumulation of foreign debt between D and 𝐷.        
In order to study how exchange rate changes feed back on its own 
dynamics, take the partial derivative of equation (1) with respect to the 
nominal exchange rate in the neighborhood of the steady state. We get: 
 
(3)   !!!" !!! = !"#!! 𝜂!"#!! 𝜒 − 𝜂!"#!! + 1 − 𝑒 !!"!"!" !"!"            
 
With 𝜒 = !"#!(!"#! !)  as the manufacturing import-export ratio; 𝑒 (!!"#!(!)/!")!"#! = 𝜂!"#!!  and 𝑒 (!!"#!(!)/!")!"#! = 𝜂!"#!!  as manufactured 
                                                
3 We assume the domestic interest rate iH to be an exogenous policy variable set by the domestic central 
bank in order to achieve its inflation target.  
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goods import and export elasticities to the exchange rate. 
 
Equation (3) defines the negative or positive effect that an exchange rate 
shift has on its own dynamics. The first part of equation (3) is the well-
known Marshall-Learner condition in the case of an initial (manufacturing) 
trade imbalance. In the last decades, financial deregulation has made 
financial transactions overwhelmingly relevant in explaining exchange rate 
dynamics. Correspondingly, the second part of equation (3) takes into 
account how an exchange rate shift may affect net capital flows, portfolio 
investment in particular. The sign of equation (3) can be either negative (a 
depreciated exchange rate tames further depreciation) or positive (unstable 
feedbacks in the exchange rate dynamics). In this regard, the more 
liberalized the capital account is, the more intensively capital movements 
respond to exchange rate shifts. This fact likely outstrips possible stabilizing 
effects passing through trade flows, and gives rise to exchange rate 
instability. In the rest of the paper we investigate such unstable scenario. 
The effect of a higher foreign debt stock D on the exchange rate 
dynamics is clearly positive. First, an increase in D leads foreign lenders to 
be more skeptical about new credit lines granted to the home economy, so 
that (𝜕𝜎 𝜕𝐷) > 0. Portfolio investment might probably decrease as well as 
the demand for domestic currency does. Second, higher debt stocks imply 
tougher debt burdens and heavier interest payments. The demand for foreign 
currency increases and the domestic exchange rate depreciates. The positive 
link between D and 𝑒 is formally stated in the derivative below: 
 !!!" !!! = 𝑒𝑖! − 𝑒 !!"!"!" !"!" > 0    
 
According to the economic relationships encapsulated in equations (1) 
and (2), dynamics in the exchange rate and foreign debt stock can be 
described according to the Jacobian matrix J: 
 𝐽 = 𝑒𝐷         𝑒 𝐷+ +− −  
 
The signs of partial derivatives in matrix J reveal that both geometric loci 
for constant values of e and D slope downward. A locus for (𝐷 = 0) that is 
flatter than the isocline for (𝑒 = 0) gives rise to a focus. Cyclical fluctuations 
around the equilibrium point A will be stable and convergent to equilibrium 
should the Jacobian matrix’s trace tr.(J) be negative. Possible (converging) 
fluctuations and exchange rate volatility characterizing such economy are 
portrayed in Figure 1. 
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[Figure 1] 
 
Let us assume now that new natural resources are discovered. This fact 
likely leads to a spike in net FDI targeting domestic natural resources. At the 
same time, primary commodity’s exports expNR increase due to the natural 
resource boom itself. From a graphical point of view, both facts shift the 
isocline for (𝑒 = 0) to the right (see Figure 2). A new equilibrium point B 
emerges. Two different but strictly intertwined processes unfold. 
 
[Figure 2] 
 
First, a permanent long-term appreciation of the nominal and hence real 
exchange rate takes place in the transition from equilibrium A to equilibrium 
B. This is due to the increase in primary commodity exports, which makes 
the exchange rate consistent with the external balance equilibrium 
persistently more appreciated than the exchange rate that would make 
domestic industrial development viable. This is the “pure” long-run Dutch 
disease effect as described by Bresser-Pereira (2008, 2010, 2013), and 
Bresser-Pereira et al. (2014). Such a long-lasting appreciation is even 
reinforced by the surge in natural resource-oriented FDI. 
Second, the traverse from the old equilibrium to the new one is not 
monotonic, but it is characterized by sharpened exchange rate volatility (see 
the dotted trajectory in Figure 2). In the medium run, the initial appreciation 
of the exchange rate (as due to mounting FDI and increasing natural resource 
exports) attracts additional short/medium-term portfolio investment. 
Mounting foreign portfolio investment in turn induces the exchange rate to 
appreciate even further so that the short/medium-run exchange rate 
appreciation temporarily overshoots the long-run one. However, such a 
dynamics will not last long. FDI inflows, portfolio investment, and the 
increasing export of natural resources jointly contribute to crowd out 
manufactured goods exports and trigger a widening manufacturing trade 
deficit by appreciating the nominal (and real) exchange rate itself. Such a 
widening manufactured goods trade account deficit, together with foreign 
firms’ profit repatriations (i.e. increasingly negative net income payments) 
determines, soon or later, an overall external deficit and downward pressures 
on the domestic currency (i.e. a positive value of 𝑒). Portfolio investment 
will first stop and then reverse together with the exchange rate dynamics. 
Eventually, the initial surge in natural resource-oriented FDI ignites a 
standard developing country external account cycle characterized by 
exchange rate volatility, macroeconomic instability and disruption in 
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economic activity (see Taylor, 2004).4 
Very importantly, following Rodrik (2007), both the long-run Dutch 
disease-induced permanent appreciation of the exchange rate, and the 
medium-run (capital flow-led) exchange rate volatility likely undermine 
manufacturing development. Indeed, manufacturing sector firms have to 
plan production and export activities ahead of effective sales, and take 
investment decisions with a long-term horizon profile. From their point of 
view, there is a big difference between a managed devaluation of the 
nominal exchange rate, which is aimed (by domestic monetary institutions) 
at maintaining a stable and competitive real exchange rate, and a temporary 
devaluation, which is a transitory phase of a more general and permanent 
process of real exchange rate appreciation, and that results from sharpened 
exchange rate volatility very often associated with macroeconomic 
instability and economic slowdown, if not contraction (see Taylor 2004; 
Frenkel and Rapetti, 2009). The former scenario creates a reliable and 
optimistic environment in which manufacturing firms can take their 
decisions. On the contrary, the medium-run volatile scenario we describe is 
the source of heightened uncertainty discouraging firms from implementing 
investment projects whose profitability cannot be assessed with enough 
(Keynesian-type) confidence. This is why, in such a scenario, temporary 
exchange rate reversals and transitory devaluations give a very poor 
contribution, if any, to the promotion of domestic manufactured goods 
exports and overall domestic manufacturing development.5   
3. LONG-RUN CONSEQUENCES OF A DUTCH DISEASE-
CUM-FINANCIALIZATION BOOM 
Let’s now have a deeper look at the long-run development trajectory 
emerging out of the medium-run dynamics described above, and due to the 
Dutch disease-cum-financialization process we are describing. Consider first 
the considerable body of literature that identifies in a depreciated, 
competitive and stable real exchange rate one of the most effective 
macroeconomic variables boosting the expansion of manufacturing versus 
non-tradable goods industries (Gala, 2008; Rodrik, 2008 and 2009; Bresser-
Pereira, 2008, 2010, and 2013; Cimoli et al., 2013). Equation (4) formalizes 
                                                
4 Mishkin (2000, p.6) notes that “in many emerging market countries the balance sheets of firms, 
households and banks are substantially dollarized […] Since inflation targeting necessarily requires 
nominal exchange rate flexibility, exchange rate fluctuations are unavoidable. A large depreciation may 
increase the burden of dollar-denominated debt and produce a massive deterioration of the balance sheets, 
increasing the risks of a financial crisis”. 
5 See Fang et al. (2009), and Oreiro et al. (2014) for empirical investigations on the negative effects that 
exchange rate volatility induces on manufactured goods exports and manufacturing development, perhaps 
more than compensating for the positive effect that a “managed” exchange rate depreciation could play 
per se. 
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in the simplest way possible this point by making manufacturing 
development, here proxied by manufacturing contribution to real GDP, a 
negative function of an appreciated nominal exchange rate (i.e. a low “e” 
value) that appreciates the real one q. Nominal and real exchange rate 
appreciations dampen domestic manufacturing development by making 
homemade manufactured goods more expensive and less competitive than 
foreign ones, hence curtailing the demand that domestic manufacturing firms 
can potentially satisfy. Secondly, following Bresser-Pereira (2008, 2010, 
2013), exchange rate appreciations make domestic manufacturing not 
economically viable by squeezing its profitability with respect to competing 
industries in foreign countries, and with respect other non-manufacturing 
sectors in the home economy.   
 
(4)  𝑚 = 𝑓 𝑞(𝑒), 𝜌,𝑊𝐴!" ,𝐾!"      with !"!" !"!" > 0;   !"!" < 0;    !"!"!" <0;    !"!!!" < 0 
 
Equation (4) also grasps the implications of the medium-run dynamics 
described in the previous section and of the connected empirical evidence 
according to which exchange rate volatility (on top of long-run appreciation) 
can seriously hinder manufacturing development. In equation (4), ρ stands 
for a measure of exchange rate volatility, namely exchange rate variance. 
Perverse feedbacks between initial FDI flows, short/medium-term portfolio 
investment and exchange rate dynamics may give rise to exchange rate 
fluctuations and volatility, i.e. increasing ρ values, that put further strain on 
domestic manufacturing development.  
In equation (4), we also assume a negative relationship between 
manufacturing development and net portfolio capital inflows. Economic 
analysis has mostly focused on the effects of portfolio investment on general 
macroeconomic volatility rather than on the sectorial composition of the 
economy. Nonetheless, non-tradable sectors are very likely those sectors that 
can benefit most from a surge in portfolio foreign investment. Following 
Taylor (1991, ch.6; 1998), financial services or the real estate sector very 
often monopolized in the past the chances to get easy access to cheap 
external finance and use it to speculate on domestic financial assets. 
Finally, manufacturing GDP share is affected negatively by the size of the 
domestic natural resources sector, here represented by the capital stock KNR 
invested in the natural resources industry. 
Our analysis also rests on the well-known literature attributing specific 
growth-enhancing properties to manufacturing. This standpoint dates back to 
the theoretical contributions by Nicholas Kaldor and it is also a central pillar 
of the structuralist theory. More recently, this perspective has been formally 
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reinterpreted in several models on the natural resource curse (Sachs and 
Warner, 2001; Ros, 2001). From an empirical perspective, Imbs and 
Warzciag (2003) and Klinger and Lederman (2004) note that the 
development process significantly hinges upon the diversification of a 
country’s productive structure. Manufacturing provides more opportunities 
than other sectors in terms of innovation, enlargement of the production 
space, and export diversification. Consequently, manufacturing development 
represents a “positive” structural change that feeds growth and economic 
take off (Rodrik, 2009; Rajan and Subramanian, 2011). 
Equation (5) formalizes the essence of the Kaldorian and structuralist 
arguments on the pro-growth properties characterizing manufacturing. We 
assume a positive relationship between manufacturing GDP share m and the 
overall labor productivity growth rate yl. 
 
(5)  𝑦! = 𝑔(𝑚)      with !!!!" > 0 and ! !!! !"!" < 0 
 
On the basis of equations (4) and (5), the long-run development effects of 
the Dutch disease-cum-financialization phenomenon we analyze are 
depicted in Figure 3. In the top-left panel of Figure 3, we put in relation 
those values of the exchange rate e and net portfolio capital flows WAPI that 
keep the manufacturing GDP share constant. According to the signs of the 
partial derivatives’ to equation (4), the locus for constant m values slopes 
upwards. In Figure 3, the “mA curve” represents all possible e-WAPI 
combinations that keep the manufacturing GDP share equal to mA, i.e. its 
initial value in the equilibrium point A. Points below (above) the “mA curve” 
stand for levels of manufacturing development lower (higher) than mA. 
According to equation (4), the position of the map of contour curves for 
different m values depends on ρ and KN. Should ρ and/or KN increase, the 
isocline for values of m equal to mA will move upwards. The top-right panel 
of Figure 3 depicts the positive relationship between the nominal exchange 
rate e and m as encapsulated in equation (4). Ultimately, the bottom-left 
panel of Figure 3 reproduces the positive link between manufacturing 
development and the overall labor productivity growth. 
Now let us assume that a natural resources boom attracts new FDIs. The 
capital stock KNR increases and natural resources production and exports 
expand. Ceteris paribus, this implies a direct contraction of the 
manufacturing GDP share. In the top-left panel of Figure 3, this shock is 
represented by a parallel upward shift of the “mA isocline” (from mA to mA1). 
Apart from this first direct effect, the medium-run cyclical dynamics 
described above is portrayed in the top-left panel of Figure 3 by the black 
dotted line. The economy moves away from the initial equilibrium A and 
fluctuate around the final equilibrium B. According to such a cyclical 
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traverse towards the new equilibrium, increasing exchange rate volatility 
takes place, and ρ increases in equation (4). Such heightened exchange rate 
volatility jeopardizes manufacturing development even further. In the top-
left panel of Figure 3, a perverse second-round upward shift in the “mA 
isocline” (from mA1 to mA2) occurs.  
 
[Figure 3] 
 
In the new equilibrium point B, following Bresser-Pereira (2008, 2010, 
2013), the increasing exploitation and exports of primary commodities lead 
the exchange rate e to assume a new and permanently more appreciated 
long-run value than the initial one. This is the standard Dutch disease-linked 
cause of de-industrialization. 
In the top-right panel of Figure 3 we reproduce the long-run contraction 
of domestic manufacturing in the (e-m) space. The leftward movement of the 
(e-m) curve represents the effects on manufacturing development due to both 
the initial FDI shock, and the ensuing financialization-led exchange rate and 
macroeconomic volatility. The downward movement along the new dashed 
line from eA to eB is the outcome of the long-run Dutch disease-led exchange 
rate appreciation. Manufacturing participation to GDP eventually drops from 
mA to mB. 
Consistently with our assumptions, in the bottom-left panel of Figure 3 
we show how a perverse mix of Dutch disease and financialization can 
eventually lead to a permanent slowdown in the growth rate of labor 
productivity (from ylA to ylB) by impeding manufacturing development (or 
inducing de-industrialization) to take place.   
4. POLICY OPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analyzes a complex nest between Dutch disease and 
financialization (including the Colombian one), which is generally 
overlooked by the standard literature. Therefore, we consider two different 
but connected macroeconomic policies that might be useful to tackle the 
above Dutch-disease-cum-financialization phenomenon. We jointly take into 
account financial flow controls and the exchange rate policy implemented by 
domestic monetary authorities. 
The exchange rate fluctuations we describe originate from a vicious spiral 
between volatile capital flows and exchange rate dynamics. The destabilizing 
effects of short/medium-term capital flights are clear. This paper provides 
further support to the already existing convincement that short/medium-term 
foreign portfolio investment should be tightly controlled. In particular, it 
might be useful to sharply reduce the sensitiveness of capital flows to 
exchange rate changes through taxation schemes that target and possibly 
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squeeze capital gains emerging from the appreciation of the exchange rate. 
In order to clarify this point, let us assume that policy intervention is 
successful in removing destabilizing connections between portfolio foreign 
investment and the exchange rate. The locus for 𝐷 = 0  gets vertical (see 
Figure 4). On top of this, the locus for 𝑒 = 0  may turn out to be positively 
sloped. Once removed destabilizing forces connecting e to 𝑒   through the 
dynamics in portfolio capital flows, a depreciation of the exchange rate will 
more easily improve the trade account and the overall BoPs, provided that 
the Marshall-Learner condition holds true. In this new framework, the 
“pure” Dutch disease still appreciates the exchange rate, hence undermining 
the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing. Yet, exchange rate volatility 
and developing country-type Minskyan cycles are avoided. The system 
becomes stable. This positively affects long-run economic development and 
the relative expansion of manufacturing by providing a more stable and safer 
context for taking long-term often irreversible investment decisions. 
 
[Figure 4] 
 
In spite of a much more stable macroeconomic environment, the Dutch 
disease and FDI-induced pressures on long-run exchange rate appreciation 
still continue to jeopardize manufacturing development. In order to 
effectively face this problem, the domestic central bank could intervene on 
the currency market and avoid nominal appreciation by increasing its own 
foreign reserves. A rise in 𝑅 will help to bring the isocline for 𝑒 = 0  back 
to its original position or shift it upward in Figure 4. The domestic exchange 
rate could thus remain constant or even depreciate. Perverse effects of the 
Dutch disease and natural resource-oriented FDI on the competitiveness of 
domestic manufacturing could be neutralized or even reverted.  
More generally, we consider an economic scenario in which a Dutch 
disease and FDI-induced initial surplus in the external account drives home 
currency to appreciate. According to Frenkel (2008), this is the context in 
which the well-know trilemma does not hold true. The domestic central bank 
can in fact intervene on the currency market, accumulate foreign reserves, 
maintain an independent monetary policy, and manage the exchange rate 
according to its own objectives even in presence of unfettered capital 
movements.  
Such a monetary policy stance largely departs from a strict inflation 
targeting monetary policy. Monetary policy should pursue a wider range of 
goals far beyond price stability (which, in turn, is to pursue through a more 
general tight coordination between monetary, fiscal and social policies). 
Domestic monetary authorities should be actively involved in fostering the 
home-economy long-run development by recognizing the importance that 
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the exchange rate plays to favor productive and export diversification. They 
should take a much more developmentalist stand and support domestic 
production development by targeting an international competitive real 
exchange rate through the management of the nominal one (Bresser-Pereira, 
2010). In presence of both long-run phenomena (the Dutch disease and 
natural-resource-oriented FDI) and medium-run ones (a surge in portfolio 
investment), this goal should be pursued by promptly and aggressively piling 
up foreign reserves. In the case of Colombia, this has been done relatively 
late, in 2014 only. Much more should have been done as soon as the first 
signs of the Dutch disease manifested and capital inflows surged, this way 
appreciating the exchange rate since the beginning of the 2000s. A prompt 
and more active use of (Colombian) foreign reserves as policy tool to 
manage the exchange rate would have avoided the long-run appreciation of 
the Colombian pesos, preserved the competitiveness of Colombian 
manufactured goods, possibly maintained a close-to-equilibrium current 
account, and helped to avoid medium-run exchange rate volatility and 
macroeconomic instability.  
Past experience has revealed that exchange rate pegs are very likely to 
give rise to speculative attacks and cannot protect developing countries from 
the risks posed to economic development by appreciating real exchange 
rates. Inflation targeting monetary policy and market-driven exchange rate 
fluctuations, however, seem not to provide a reliable alternative, as exchange 
rate and macroeconomic volatility can be rather high and pressures on 
nominal and real exchange appreciation persist. In other words, the best 
BoPs/exchange rate regime seems to be a managed, and sometimes strictly 
managed exchange rate regime in which domestic monetary authorities 
target a competitive and stable real exchange rate in order to favor growth 
and employment (Ocampo, 2013). There exists increasing consensus that 
this kind of policy has proven effective for a number of East Asian countries 
(Gala, 2008; Cimoli et al., 2013), and that they could work well to tackle the 
undesirable medium and long-run effects of a Dutch disease-cum-
financialization phenomenon. This paper contributes to provide theoretical 
support to such positions. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 – Joint medium-run cycles in the exchange rate-foreign debt 
space 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Fluctuations induced by an initial surge in FDI 
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Figure 3 – Medium-to-long-run effects of Dutch disease cum 
financialization 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Capital flows’ controls and macroeconomic 
stabilization 
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